Under Sudan's Criminal Act (1991), rape is defined as zina (adultery and fornication) without consent. This means that the strict rules of evidence used for zina are also applied to rape. 
Introduction
Safiya Ishag, a young female student activist, was raped and tortured by members of the Sudanese National Security Forces after she participated in demonstrations at the University of Khartoum in 2011. Safiya is a member of a youth group called Girifna, whose name means "we are fed up." The demonstration she attended was an effort to bring the Arab Spring to Sudan. Safiya reported the rape at the local police station and circulated her story on YouTube.
1 She received overwhelming support from women activists, opposition figures, and prominent journalists, many of whom were questioned by the police on allegations that they "invented" the rape story as a means to undermine the government. Some were arrested and put on trial. Safiya was forced to flee the country in fear for her life.
According to the interpretation of Islamic law in Sudan's Criminal Act of 1991, zina is defined as unlawful sexual intercourse, that is, intercourse between individuals who are not married to each other. Since rape is categorized as zina without consent, the strict rules of evidence used for zina are also applied to rape. Moreover, rape victims can be convicted of zina and punished. These provisions constitute a serious legal obstacle for rape victims like Safiya.
Over the last several years, the reform of criminal law on rape/zina has become a priority for Sudanese women activists, despite government repression of those advocating extensive reforms. The peace agreement between the north and south of Sudan in 2005 opened the door for a discussion of legal reform. Meanwhile, the outbreak of armed conflict in the western province of Darfur, with rampant sexual violence, focused attention on rape as a war crime under international law. These developments have triggered an extensive debate, spearheaded by women activists, on legal reform of rape/zina under Sudanese law. There are significant divergences between the government's definition of rape and that of women 3 activists, particularly with respect to marital rape. The entire topic has become politicized and polarized, with little or no dialogue between the government and women activists.
In general, literature on rape/zina is scarce, especially with respect to Sudan (Sidahmed, 2001; Abdel Halim, 2011) . With the exception of a book by Ziba Mir-Hosseini and Vanja Hamzić (2010) 
titled Control and Sexuality: The Revival of Zina Laws in Muslim
Contexts, most of the literature on the subject deals with Pakistan. It largely focuses on the legal discrimination inherent in the law and its implementation as well as on the role of feminists in advocating reform, including the use of Islamic arguments (Khan, 2004 (Khan, , 2006 Imran, 2005) . Situating the topic within the existing literature, this article provides new empirical data from Sudan on reform of zina/rape provisions in criminal law.
It is difficult to conduct fieldwork in such a highly polarized political environment without putting informants at risk of arrest and intimidation. Fieldwork for this study was agencies, and government institutions, including the police, as well as with scholars and journalists. The interviewees were recruited through a network of contacts that the author has developed through years of field visits to Sudan, beginning in 2006 . For the reasons stated above, the interviewees must remain anonymous.
The article is divided into three parts. The first unpacks the rape/zina stipulations in Among the offenses for which hudud penalties are prescribed is zina. In Islamic jurisprudence, zina is defined as sexual intercourse between a man and woman outside a valid marriage contract. The punishment is the same for female and male offenders, but it differs depending on whether the offenders are married to other people. There are two categories of offenders: muhsan, defined as free men and women, of full age and understanding, who enjoy lawful wedlock; and non-muhsan, who do not fulfill these conditions. The penalty for zina between muhsan, that is, between two people married to others, is death by stoning; for zina between non-muhsan, or unmarried people, it is 100 lashes. (1) There shall be deemed to commit adultery:
(a) every man who has sexual intercourse with a woman without there being a lawful bond between them;
(b) every woman who permits a man to have sexual intercourse with her without there being a lawful bond between them.
Article 146 details the punishment for zina:
(1) Whoever commits the offence of adultery shall be punished with:
6 (a) execution by stoning where the offender is married (muhsan);
(b) 100 lashes where the offender is not married (non-muhsan) ( 2) The male non-married offender may be punished, in addition to whipping, with expatriation for one year.
(3) Being muhsan means having a valid persisting marriage at the time of the commission of adultery, provided that such marriage has been consummated. 6 The Criminal Act goes on to define rape as sexual intercourse outside lawful wedlock-that is, zina-"without consent." Article 149 states:
(1) There shall be deemed to commit the offence of rape whoever has sexual intercourse by way of adultery or homosexuality with any person without consent.
(2) Consent shall not be recognised where the offender has custody or authority over the victim.
(3) Whoever commits the offence of rape shall be punished with a hundred lashes and with imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, unless rape constitutes the offence of adultery or homosexuality, then it is punishable with death.
It should be noted that according to the law, a person who is not an adult cannot give consent. This means that children have better protection under the law than adults.
The definition of rape as zina without consent in the Criminal Act means that rape must be proved according to the rules of evidence applying to zina (Sidahmed, 2001; Abdel Halim, 2011) . According to article 62 of the Evidence Act of 1994, the offense of zina must be proved by any one of the following: (a) confession before the court, unless retracted prior to execution of the sentence; (b) the testimony of four adult men; (c) pregnancy of the woman if she is unmarried; (d) refusal of the wife to take a lian oath, if the husband has taken the oath.
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The evidentiary rules applying to zina are historically based on the rationale in classical Islamic jurisprudence that there should be indisputable evidence for the severe punishment envisaged (Mir-Hosseini and Hamzić, 2010) . When applied to rape, however, "The evidentiary threshold has contributed to impunity for rape as a conviction can realistically only be secured where the perpetrator confesses to the crime"
(REDRESS/KCHRED, 2008a, p. 10). As the evidence is virtually impossible to obtain, a rapist "can only be incriminated if he voluntarily decides to confess his guilt before the authorities" (Sidahmed 2001, p. 203) . The evidentiary rule, therefore, effectively "renders the prosecution of rape difficult if not impossible" (REDRESS/KCHRED, 2008b, p. 23).
Furthermore, if a woman reports a rape and starts a court case, she risks being charged with the crime of zina, because her allegation of rape is considered to be in itself a confession of zina. If the confession is retracted, in theory it is no longer valid and the victim can no longer be punished for the hadd crime. There are nonetheless cases in which Sudanese courts have refused to accept the retraction of the "confession" (Sidahmed, 2001; REDRESS, 2008 Even in situations where the rape is not reported to the police and no court case is initiated, an unmarried woman who becomes pregnant because of rape is at risk for charges of zina. Sudan follows the Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence, in which pregnancy in an unmarried woman is considered evidence of zina. In the other three schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence, pregnancy does not constitute proof of zina. The presumption of zina on grounds of pregnancy puts women and girl defendants in a disadvantageous position compared to men and boys accused of the same offense (Sidahmed, 2001 ). The woman is the one who has to bring evidence that (a) the man has committed zina and that (b) she did not consent. Failure to prove both (a) and (b) means that the man walks free from the hadd punishment, but she is still subject to it (Sidahmed, 2001 ). The consequence, in the words of an activist, is that "if you cannot prove rape, you become the perpetrator." 12 According to Asma Abdel Halim (2011, p. 233 ) the "law starts from the premise that a rape victim is a liar."
Although women have been sentenced to death by stoning for zina, this punishment has never been carried out in Sudan, according to Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban (2012, p. 125) . By contrast, the punishment of lashes is frequently enforced for zina and other breaches of public morality. 13 Any childbirth in a government hospital where there is no father to put his name on the birth certificate must be reported to the police, who will apply 100 lashes for an unmarried woman (Fluehr-Lobban, 2012, p. 125 ).
According to the Sudanese scholar Abdel Salam Sidahmed (2001, p. 203) ,
The categorization of rape as a form of zina has often led to applying the same stringent method of evidence used in proving a zina case, to establish a rape crime.
[…] This does not just result in a rapist walking free from the court room or receiving a very light sentence, but may even lead to incrimination of the victim of rape.
Female victims of rape thus suffer grave injustices in Sudanese courts (Köndgen, 2010, p. 211) . These women are victimized twice: "first by the men who assaulted them, and then by the legal authorities who treated each of them as the guilty party" (Sidahmed, 2001, p. 198) .
The Darfur Conflict and the Politicization of Rape
The armed conflict between the government and rebel groups in Darfur, principally the Sudan One strategy used by proponents of reform is to showcase the differences between the Islamic law schools. Concerning the Criminal Act, they point out the injustice of including pregnancy as evidence of zina in the Maliki law school when the other three law schools do not do this. Exercising preference among the different law schools is known as takhayyur. that not all marriages are based on genuine consent. Under the Muslim family law, both parties must consent to marriage. However, the age of consent for marriage, according to the law, is puberty, which has been interpreted to apply to girls as young as 10 years of age.
Moreover, the woman needs a male guardian (a father, brother, or uncle) to contract the marriage (article 25). This follows the practice of the Maliki school, revoking a judicial circular from 1960 based on the precepts of the Hanafi school, according to which a woman can contract marriage herself without a male guardian. The debate on marital rape, therefore, is closely linked to the discussions of both child marriage and male guardianship (wali) in relation to a girl's or woman's marriage contract.
The Sudan Organization for Research and Development (SORD) has advocated for an end to child marriage. In the alternative law presented by Asha El-Karib of SORD, the articles in the current law that give authority to the male guardian are completely removed. 32 In the opinion of SORD activists, it is imperative to challenge the current family law, as it is based on "the philosophy […] that women are less than men." Women activists, however, were largely excluded from these initiatives. The activities were led by the government's Violence against Women Unit, established in 2005. 35 It is headed by a conservative woman who is considered to be among the hard-liners in the government. The unit is controversial, and some activists see its creation as the government's "attempt to whiten their face so that they could [appear to] take the lead in handling the problem of sexual violence" in the wake of the Darfur conflict. 36 But in the eyes of the opposition, human rights activists, and women activists, the government is to blame for the sexual violence in the Darfur conflict in the first place. Despite the name of the unit, its leader has on several occasions stated that there is no violence against women in Sudan. (Tønnessen & al-Nagar, 2013 ).
These women in charge of these two government initiatives do not communicate with each other. They represent two conflicting tendencies within the current regime-on one hand, moderates urging reform from within, coupled with a critique of the president, and on the other hand, conservatives or hard-liners supporting the status quo. In addition to divisions at higher levels, lower-level officials implementing the projects may also have their own views. A policewoman stated in an interview that "the issues of violence against women and rape are politicized because the politicians at the top are narrow-minded and think only within a religious point of view." She went on to say that Sudan needs a domestic violence bill.
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There is thus a diversity of views within the government on the issue of violence against women, a reflection of the more general processes of factionalization and erosion of support for the president's authoritarian leadership.
The Committee on Criminal Act Reform, established by Amira al-Fadil and the Women Centre for Human Rights, has identified legal problems in the Criminal Act and recommended reforms of articles 149 and 3. In relation to article 149, the committee's report states that "rape is a crime that includes both a victim and a perpetrator. It needs to be proven as a common crime clearly differentiated from zina, which relies on evidences specified in Islamic scriptures" (Women Centre for Human Rights 2009). In other words, the report tries to delink rape from the hudud, consistent with the campaign by women activists to differentiate between rape and zina in the Criminal Act. However, the report is completely silent on the issue of marital rape. One member of the committee stated in an interview that although "there was a big debate among the members about marital rape, it was not mentioned in the recommendations […] They say it does not exist in Sudan." 38 This report took the 2005 constitution as the main legal framework, but it also considered national laws and international human rights conventions that Sudan has ratified.
Of particular importance are the national Child Act of 2010 and the international Convention on the Rights of the Child, both of which define a child as a person below 18 years of age.
This becomes clear in the reform suggested for article 3 of the Criminal Act, which relates to the definition of a child. As the law stands now, it does not stipulate a specific age of adulthood, but merely makes reference to the physical signs of puberty. The legal uncertainty in the definition of a child causes confusion in judges' interpretation of the law. To illustrate the problem, the report refers to the case of a 16-year-old girl who was raped by an adult man in 2012. He was sentenced to death by the State Court, which considered the victim to be a child. But the Appeals Court considered the girl an adult because she showed signs of puberty. Since the girl could not prove lack of consent, the case was treated as zina.
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According to the law reform committee, the Criminal Act should define a specific age of adulthood-which is also the age of consent-in order to remove this uncertainty. The report states that "article 3 in the Criminal Act should specify age of adulthood as 18 years, taking the Child Act, 2010, the African Protocol, and the interpretation of Abu Hanifa School as references."
The authors of the report are careful to argue within the bounds of a religious perspective, but they nonetheless challenge gendered injustices in classical interpretations of Islamic law. Sanction of child marriages in the Islamic law schools is based on religious sources that assert that the prophet Muhammad married Aisha when she was nine years of age. According to an Islamist woman closely involved in the law review process in Sudan, this precedent is "misunderstood" and must be viewed in the historical context it arose from. Interviews with Islamist women make clear that they do not necessarily propose reforms aimed at gender equality along the same lines as the reforms sought by women activists. Some, however, favor minor reforms within the paradigm of qawama, or male guardianship. The Islamist gender ideology builds strongly on this concept, in which women and men have different and complementary roles and responsibilities within the family because they are born biologically different. In the Muslim family, the ideal man is the protector and provider, while the ideal woman is the nurturer and caregiver (Tønnessen, 2011) . The Islamic principle of nafaqa specifies that once a marriage has been consummated, the husband becomes responsible for providing for his wife and children. The concept of male guardianship builds on this precept. According to Barbara Stowasser (1998, p. 33 Many demonstrators were arrested, tortured, and subjected to sexual violence by the security police. It appears that the government successfully suppressed an "Arab Spring" in Sudan.
President Bashir admonished protesters, "Those who expect an Arab Spring will not see it because Sudan has a hot summer that will burn its enemies and grill them". 44 But widespread discontent persists, not only among the political opposition but among some Islamists, who are becoming increasingly vocal in criticizing the president in public (El Gizouli, 2012 While the post-CPA period opened space for the mobilization of women to advocate law reform, it also saw the emergence of Salafists, who have used this new space to advocate measures that would limit rather than expand women's rights. They mobilized against Amira al-Fadil when she tried to criminalize genital cutting in the national Child Act (2010), and they successfully lobbied the president to remove the article at the last minute. President
Bashir has turned to the Salafists for support amid increased national and international pressures on his regime (Tønnessen & al-Nagar, 2013) . Both the opposition and moderates within the government are worried about this development and its effect on the status of women's rights. 47 According to an Islamist woman closely involved in the legal review processes, "The extremists, the Salafists, are against the concept of law reform. They say Islamic law is the Quran and Sunna and it cannot be changed." There is little or no dialogue between women in government and women activists outside government on these issues. My interviews revealed that the two groups did not even know about each other's initiatives for law reform on rape/zina. Although both groups agree on the need to clearly differentiate between rape and zina in the law in order to reduce the high burden of proof for rape, they disagree sharply on what constitutes rape and on whether there is such a thing as marital rape. There are conflicting claims regarding women's legal rights under Islam on the key issues of consent and obedience. Women activists advocate that marital rape should be criminalized in the Criminal Act and that the requirements for female obedience and male guardianship in the family law should be abolished. Women in government argue for the continuation of qawama (male guardianship), which requires that a woman have the permission of her guardian to marry. Moreover, because the wife has to be obedient to her husband, she cannot deny him sexual intercourse. By this logic, the concept of marital rape does not exist.
The politicization of rape in the wake of the ICC indictment has curtailed the political space not only for women activists, but also for moderates within the regime. At least two conflicting tendencies are emerging within the government: moderates call for reform and criticize President Omar al-Bashir, while conservatives defend the status quo and the president. These tendencies are associated with competing legal reform initiatives and conflicting views on women's rights. Because the issue of rape is so politicized and is directly linked to the ICC process, moderates who favor legal reform on this issue are increasingly sidelined, which makes the debate appear even more polarized and law reform even less likely to take place.
